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The control of onchocerciasis is not only a major success story in global health, but also one of the best examples of
the power of public-private partnership at the international level as well as at the national level. The onchocerciasis
story is also a leading example of the contribution of a group of called Non-Governmental Development Organizations
(NGDO) to operational research which resulted in important changes in treatment strategies and policies.
The four case studies presented here illustrate some key contributions the NGDOs made to the development of
“community directed treatment with ivermectin” –CDTI, in Africa, which became the approved methodology within
the African Programme for Onchocerciasis Control (APOC). The partnership between the international, multilateral,
government institutions and the NGDO Coordination Group was the backbone of the APOC programme’s structure
and facilitated progress and scale-up of treatment programmes. Contributions included piloting community–based
methodology in Mali and Nigeria; research, collaboration and coordination on treatment strategies and policies,
coalition building, capacity building of national health workforce and advocacy at the national and international level.
While the Onchocerciasis Control Programme (OCP) and APOC provided leadership, the NGDOs working with the
national health authorities played a major role in advocacy evolving the community methodology which led to
achieving and maintaining- treatments with ivermectin for at least 20 years and strengthening community health
systems.
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Although the onchocerciasis story has been widely docu-
mented [1,2] and reviewed by e.g. the Center for Global
Development [3] and Bush and Hopkins[4], it is important
to highlight the strategies that have made it so effective. In
this publication we focus on the role that NGDOs played
in the early 1990s in empowering the communities
affected by the disease in Africa to take charge of their
own treatment programmes, which may be necessary to
sustain for 20 years or more. In 1997 the resulting CDTI
became the approved methodology within the African
Programme for Onchocerciasis Control (APOC), and the
community-directed strategy has since been further
developed and adapted for use in many other health and
development programmes [4].* Correspondence: stefanie@globalhealthconsulting.net
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APOC, Tropical Disease Research (TDR) and The World
Bank.Onchocerciasis
Onchocerciasis, a vector-borne infection caused by the
parasite Onchocerca volvulus, was highly endemic in
many parts of Africa before control activities. Infection
with the parasite can lead to severe skin disease, persist-
ent itching progressing to visual impairment and blind-
ness in early adulthood when people should be at theiral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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able land being abandoned, reducing agricultural and
economic productivity and exacerbating poverty in some
of the poorest countries. Over 120 million people were
at high risk, [5] an estimated 17.5 million people
infected and 1.5 million suffered from visual impairment
[3]. The socioeconomic importance of blindness due to
onchocerciasis was the main reason for the first multi-
partner, international control effort, the Onchocerciasis
Control Programme (OCP)[6] [7,8]. The OCP was estab-
lished in 1974 initially in seven, and later covering 11
countries in West Africa. In the absence of a safe, effect-
ive drug, it was based on weekly aerial spraying with en-
vironmentally safe insecticides to control the blackfly
vectors. Although the OCP was successful in reducing
the transmission, incidence and impact of blinding on-
chocerciasis in large areas of the 11 countries, the dis-
ease remained unchecked in other endemic countries in
West, Central and Eastern Africa. These countries were
not covered by the OCP, as aerial spraying – the only
control option available at the time - was not considered
technically feasible or cost-effective due to the forested
terrain[3]. The registration of MectizanW(ivermectin
MSD) in 1987, and the decision by Merck & Co. Inc. to
donate the drug “ for as long as needed” for the treat-
ment of onchocerciasis, radically changed control strat-
egies[9] [10]. Community trials confirmed ivermectin to
be a safe microfilaricide, a single annual dose being ef-
fective for the reduction of the microfilarial load[11-13].
In 1988, the OCP introduced large-scale ivermectin
treatment to supplement aerial spraying[2], initially
using the mobile strategy with health workers respon-
sible for treating the eligible members of the endemic
communities. However, increasingly the communities
themselves became involved in the programme manage-
ment as the benefits of a community-based approach,
piloted by the supporting NGOs, began to appear. In
parallel, from 1992–1994 studies on the importance of
skin disease and a cost benefit analysis were undertaken
which provided scientific evidence for the need to ex-
pand the control of onchocerciasis to countries in Sub
Saharan Africa outside the ambit of OCP [6,14,15].
In 1995, a second and much larger programme, the Af-
rican programme for Onchocerciasis Control (APOC),
was established to extend mass distribution of ivermectin
to the other 19 endemic countries in Africa. The APOC
programme is based on a broad international and national
partnership focused on supporting CDTI. Sustained high
coverage of annual treatments with ivermectin is neces-
sary, making long-term commitment important. The
programme now treats over 90 million people annually in
19 countries, protecting an at risk population of 115 mil-
lion, and preventing over 40,000 cases of blindness every
year [16].After ten years of CDTI a dramatic reduction in preva-
lence and microfilaria was reported in sentinel villages of
West province, Cameroon and five districts in Uganda
[17], whilst after 15–17 years of ivermectin treatment in
two onchocerciasis foci in Kaduna State, Nigeria, preva-
lence had fallen to zero level in all communities and all
individuals examined were skin-snip negative[18] .
Although this global partnership involving WHO, the
World Bank, national Ministries of Health, bilateral and
multilateral donors, NGOs and Merck & Co. Inc. has
been well documented [4,19-22], the critical role that
NGOs have played in developing an approach to mass
treatment undertaken by the affected communities
themselves, has not been as well described apart from a
recent review by Bush and Hopkins [4].We would like to
explore this role in view of the current interest in com-
munity directed health interventions.
In Latin America, the Onchocerciais Elimination
Programme of the Americas (OEPA) is also a partner-
ship involving NGOs, but uses a different strategy of
twice yearly treatment with ivermectin, but is not
covered in this review [23].Role of NGOs in community based programmes and in
health research for development
The World Bank defines NGOs as “private organizations
that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the
interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide
basic social services, or undertake community develop-
ment”. By definition then, NGOs are action–oriented
and contribute to health and development of communi-
ties world-wide. Moreover, NGOs can encourage inter-
national donors to focus on health priorities of the
country as well as good governance and accountability
through their advocacy role [24] .
Lavis et al [25] defined research as “a knowledge loop-
from generation of knowledge to its effective use”. In
this “knowledge loop” NGOs are valuable partners in re-
search for development where research is seen as a
broad process, involving not only production of know-
ledge, but also downstream and upstream activities
needed for relevance and effectiveness in setting prior-
ities and translating knowledge into action [24]. NGOs
can, and do, contribute to all different stages of health
research – advocacy, priority setting, capacity building,
resource mobilization, sharing and utilizing research
findings and networking. NGOs are traditionally
involved in activities which address health issues in re-
source–poor settings, often “at the end of the road”
where national health services may not exist. Some
NGOs undertake innovative field-based research - where
the effectiveness of these innovations is often learnt by
trial and error - and while these innovations may
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field, results are seldom analysed well or rigorously [24] .
The fact that NGOs are close to communities means
they can play a critical role in interpreting evidence and
translating it into relevance for those communities.
NGOs are often involved in piloting new strategies and
their subsequent scale-up. However, as NGO research is
often conducted on a small scale and is usually qualita-
tive in nature it often goes unrecognized by research
organizations and funding agencies. The policy impact
from experiences and lessons learnt by NGOs can be
enhanced by partnerships with other key stakeholders.
NGO involvement in onchocerciasis treatment
programmes
The onchocerciasis story is a leading example of the contri-
bution of a group of NGDOsa to operational research
which led to important changes in treatment strategies and
policies.
The four case studies (below) illustrate some of the key
contributions the NGDOs made to the development of
what became “community directed treatment with
ivermectin” (CDTI)- in particular the implementation and
scaling –up of ivermectin distribution programmes. In
onchocerciasis- endemic areas, health centres are generally
few, in distant locations from communities and resource-
poor in both commodities and qualified health personnel.
The NGDOs provided resources to complement national
programmes by supporting health care staff in remote
communities.
From 1989 a group of (primarily) prevention of
blindness NGOs independently worked with the health
services to initiate mass-distribution of ivermectin and
pioneer community–based strategies, initially in Mali
and Nigeria. Although some key stakeholders were
apprehensive about putting ivermectin into the hands
of community volunteers, these early programmes
received critical support of the OCP Director, Dr E.M.
Samba. The improvement in coverage and compliance
led to the eventual adoption by the OCP and the
increasing acceptance of the importance of devolving
authority to the community.
The River Blindness Foundation (RBF), founded in 1990
specifically to broaden distribution of ivermectin [26],
funded many of the early treatment programmes supported
by individual NGDOs in countries outside of the OCP area.
It soon became apparent that collaboration between the
NGDOs would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of
the treatment programmes and the NGDO Coordination
Group for Onchocerciasis Control was created in 1991.
(Figure 1.) This group has met regularly ever since, and
all those interviewed for the purpose of this document
agreed that the collaboration has been a positive and con-
structive experience, which has not only supported theonchocerciasis programmes for 20 years but has also led
to other joint initiatives in health. The NGDOs shared
their innovations, experiences and lessons learnt in order
to standardize methodology and increase effectiveness.
The NGDO coordination group also worked collabora-
tively on approaches to donors for advocacy and fund-
raising [4,10]. As WHO, Tropical Diseases Research (TDR
) and the Mectizan Donation Program (MDP) are
included in the biannual meetings, important operation
research issues are also addressed. One example was the
need for a proxy for weight determination of ivermectin
dosage. The early programmes had to weigh each person
to determine the number of tablets they should take -
which was not practical for mass treatment or a
community-based strategy. The Nigerian National Eye
Centre in Kaduna and research associates in London,
NGDO personnel, and national programme staff collected
the data on height /weight and optimal dosing categories
[27]. This data allowed the Mectizan Expert Committee to
endorse the height/weight treatment strategy in 1993, a
change in policy which opened the door to a community–
based approach to ivermectin distribution. Locally made
colour-coded measuring poles simplified the correct dos-
ing of each individual. These are now used by many other
preventative mass chemotherapy programmes.
Collaboration between NGDOs was also needed at coun-
try level. In order to move away from a rather fragmented
approach to support for ivermectin distribution, the
NGDO coordination group encouraged the establishment
of an NGDO coalition in each country. Building on the
experiences of developing community-based approaches to
onchocerciasis control pioneered by NGDOs and their
government partners, TDR initiated multi-country studies
to provide the kind of scientific evidence necessary for
donors and policy-makers [28]. The TDR multi-country
studies showed the potential of what became known as
Community-Directed Treatment with Ivermectin (CDTI),
as well as illustrating the value of NGDO partnership with
WHO and TDR. CDTI was formally adopted by APOC in
1997 as its principal strategy. While their work contributed
significantly to the development of CDTI, the scaling up of
this new strategy was spearheaded by the NGDOs whose
strength lies in working together with communities and
governments of endemic countries.
Figure 2 highlights key milestones in the development
of the research cycle which led to improvements in
programme implementation.
Development of Community Directed Treatment with
Ivermectin (CDTI)
There was a spectrum of activities that eventually led to
CDTI, from a top down, ‘paramilitary’ approach of distribu-
tion of the ivermectin tablets by a mobile team of health



























































Figure 1 The NGDOs supporting ivermectin distribution programmes in Africa ( 2011).
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http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/10/1/16treatment with ivermectin (CBTI), to the grass-roots Com-
munity Directed Treatment with Ivermectin (CDTI).
These are illustrated in Figure 3. A simple and succinct
explanation of the essential difference between Commu-
nity–Based Treatment with Ivermectin( CBTI) and CDTI
is: in CBTI the community is involved but is led; in CDTI
the community is involved and leads the process, planning
and management of treatment.
Case studies in each of the APOC countries, the starting
point for onchocerciasis distribution programmes was dif-
ferent. The following case studies from four countries that
initiated early ivermectin distribution programmes sup-
ported by NGDOs illustrate some of the unique challenges
they addressed.
Case study 1: Mali
Introduction
In West African savannah areas the prevalence of oncho-
cerciasis was as high as 80–100 per cent by the age of 20
[29]. Further, virtually every person 40–50 years of age inhyper-endemic communities was either severely visually
impaired or totally blind, and regions were frequently
depopulated because of the high rates of blindness. This
was the situation in Mali prior to onchocerciasis control
activities. The area of Mali east of Bamako endemic for
onchocerciasis was in the original Onchocerciasis Control
Programme (OCP) area. The Western extension [1] later
included the remaining areas of Mali west of Bamako.
Larviciding operations of OCP certainly reduced the trans-
mission of onchocerciasis significantly but impacted only
slowly on infection and blindness due to disease. In 1987,
after 12 years of vector control, a study to estimate the
number of people infected and blinded by the disease, in
order to prioritize populations for ivermectin treatment,
showed communities in endemic foci were still at risk of
onchocercal blindness [30]. The registration of ivermectin
(MectizanW) for the treatment of onchocerciasis in 1987
meant that the OCP could modify its strategy. In the
original OCP area, ivermectin treatment was combined
with vector control in areas where vector control had not
been very effective. This combination strategy was used in
Figure 2 Milestones in the research and evolution of CDTI.
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treatment alone was used.
Early treatment strategies
The OCP started ivermectin treatments in Mali with a
mobile team approach - this reflected the military–like
operations that the OCP used with the aerial spraying
operations. ‘You do what you know how to –‘(former
NGDO Coordinator). At the beginning, the OCP head-
quarters in Ouagadougou decided on the timing of drug
distribution, and provided the drugs and the vehicles. Fur-
thermore, the EPI (Extended Programme of Immunization)
team from Ouagadougou would go to the field with the na-
tional team to inform the village chief, and nurses would
carry out treatment and monitor any side effects. OCP pro-
vided perdiems to both the OCP and national teams, which
meant motivation for this mobile team approach was high,
but not sustainable.
Early NGDO involvement
In the early 1990s Sightsavers had begun to support eye
care in a small way in Mali. In 1989, Sightsavers andCBM met to discuss the potential of ivermectin for
prevention of blindness and Sightsavers decided to take
the lead in Mali by assisting the OCP and the Ministry
of Health in their aim to eliminate onchocerciasis as a
disease of public health importance. Sightsavers
appointed a River Blindness Coordinator in 1990 with
the goal of promoting and supporting onchocerciasis
control and integrating ivermectin distribution with
other aspects of eye care in the countries where Sightsa-
vers was present. In Mali, Sightsavers collaborated
closely with the OCP in planning and logistics as all the
drugs came though the OCP. In 1992 the Organisation
Pour la Prévention de la Cécité (OPC) started working
in the Kankan region of Guinea and expanded its iver-
mectin treatment programmes to Western areas of Mali,
in collaboration with Sightsavers.
The Pilot Programme
The River Blindness Coordinator joined Sightsavers after
three years of working on phase iv trials of ivermectin in
Liberia. He was already convinced of the safety of the
drug and that a simple system to deal with adverse side
Figure 3 The spectrum of activities leading to CDTI.
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team. From 1991, Sightsavers pioneered community–
based distribution which enabled treatment of a large
number of people with the assistance of the community
being treated. The community-based approach was
piloted in the Baguineda sub-district of the district of
Kati (the Koulikoro Region of southern Mali), in collab-
oration with the national onchocerciasis control
programme, the District Medical Officer and sub-district
health staff.
In the early community-based distribution approach, a
community health worker (CHW) from the health
centre (usually extension workers for immunization or
TB) would go to the community, explain the programme
and agree the best time for distribution. Community
members would assist the CHW on the day of distribu-
tion. As the community-based approach evolved, com-
munity members achieved more “authority” and
involvement, such as deciding when and how distribu-
tion would take place. The early Malian programmes did
not use the dose poles, but age proxies : small children
(under 5 s – determined by not being able to touch theopposite ear by reaching over their head) got nothing. . ..
Up to 4 tablets for ‘fat/heavy/big people’.
When this method proved to be effective and
acceptable - and following the 1991 meeting in Geneva on
strategies for ivermectin distribution through primary
health care systems - Sightsavers expanded its intervention
to other districts. As the programmes expanded in 1993,
Sightsavers and OPC coordinated with the OCP on which
areas each NGDO would support.
The Baguineda programme was close to Bamako and
was thus used by Sightsavers as a demonstration area for
other programmes (e.g. Nigeria, Cameroon, Guinea
Conakry) to come and learn how the programme
operated.
Challenges
At the outset this method of community participation met
with some resistance from members of the Mectizan
Expert Committee (MEC), the advisory committee on the
use of the drug. They voiced concerns about the appropri-
ateness of using volunteers and hence drug safety. The
OCP senior staff also doubted whether solid data could be
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demonstrate that ivermectin could be safely distributed
with minimal supervision from health staff. The support
of the OCP Director was very important for the NGDOs
as he was able to interact at Ministry level and remove
obstacles if there were problems with the national team.
‘ We are on the verge of something very exciting ’
Sightsavers Director, after his visit to Mali, September 1991.
Development of Community Directed Treatment with
Ivermectin (CDTI)
As the community-based concept got established, and
with the anticipated closure of OCP in 2002 and the
“devolution” of onchocerciasis control to national teams
in OCP countries, the need for installing a sustainable
CDTI approach was critical. OCP recognised that this
would enable the countries, at a minimum cost, to
ensure that onchocerciasis would never remain a
problem of public health importance after the end of
OCP, thus fulfilling the objectives of the programme.
However the change to community management and
away from mobile teams initially met with considerable
resistance from the national onchocerciasis control
personnel who saw the loss of their per diem incentives.
CDTI really started after the protocol development
workshop for the multi-country study on effectiveness
and sustainability held in Bamako in 1994, when the
concept of “community self-treatment” (later changed to
Community Directed Treatment) was developed. Fund-
ing for the multi-country study was from the OCP, TDR
and APOC. The Kayes region was part of the Malian
component of this multi-country study.
From Control to Elimination of Infection and Transmission
At the closure of the OCP in 2002, after 27 years of vector
control and 12 – 15 years of ivermectin distribution, over
1.56 million people in the programme area were receiving
annual treatment. These strategies were successful in
interrupting transmission where vector control was effect-
ively applied and succeeded in eliminating onchocerciasis
as a public health problem [2]. Longitudinal studies started
in 2005 in Mali and Senegal to determine whether the
parasite could be eliminated through ivermectin treatment
only. The first results have provided empirical evidence
that elimination of onchocerciasis with ivermectin treat-
ment is feasible in some endemic foci in Africa [31], and
the principle of elimination has since then been
established.
Integrating onchocerciasis programmes with other health
and development activities
In Mali, the original goal of Sightsavers was to integrate
the onchocerciasis treatment programmes with primaryeye care, but this was not possible until the CDTI was
established and strong, although early work took place
to provide rehabilitation services for people blinded by
the disease. By 2005, the onchocerciasis control
programmes had been integrated into the comprehen-
sive eye care in the Sightsavers and OPC supported
projects. They supported the training of the Community
Directed Distributors (CDD) in primary eye care,
cataract and trachoma referral. Helen Keller Inter-
national (HKI) promoted the delivery of vitamin A to
infants - a simple intervention that meant that even
those not eligible for ivermectin received an important
health benefit. The integration between the onchocercia-
sis and lymphatic filariasis (LF) programmes at the
country level helped to demonstrate the economic bene-
fit of an integrated approach to disease control/elimin-
ation. The Neglected Tropical Diseases programme is
now based entirely on the CDTI strategy .
‘Learn to listen to the community - When Dr. Samba
visited Mali, it was the villagers who said to him “ Give
us the drugs and we will distribute them. You must treat
everyone in the village, even those on the other side of the
River”’. (Former OCP Director).
Case Study 2 : Nigeria
Introduction
Onchocerciasis, first reported in northern Nigeria in
1908 [32], was widespread throughout the country. Ocu-
lar onchocerciasis, the second leading cause of blindness
in Nigeria, was prevalent in parts of northern Nigeria,
[33] and onchocercal skin disease (OSD) was widespread
in the rain forest and savanna/mosaic areas[34,35].
In 1956 Budden estimated the number of infected
persons at 339,000, with about 20,000 blind due to
onchocerciasis[32]. However, following the comprehen-
sive nationwide prevalence survey by the national
onchocerciasis control programme (NOCP) from 1987
to 1990, it was realized that the disease was prevalent in
all but three of its 36 States and that nearly 30 million
people needed treatment. Nigeria accounts for nearly
40% of the world’s burden of onchocerciasis[36].
Vector control measures were initiated in the early 60s
in certain river basins and the WHO later opened an on-
chocerciasis research centre in Nigeria. The NOCP with
its Technical Advisory Committee was established in
1982, and in 1987 task forces were established at national,
zonal and State levels, and State Onchocerciasis Control
Units were formed in the endemic States. However, the
control of onchocerciasis in Nigeria posed a major
challenge to the government.
The adoption of a federal structure after independence
in 1960 meant that health services including onchocer-
ciasis control activities were provided concurrently by
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government areas (LGAs) after their creation in 1976. In
1988, following the Alma Ata declaration, Nigeria
adopted a primary health care (PHC) policy and strategy
for universal coverage, with the local government level
as the central fulcrum for control activities [37],
supported by the State and Federal governments.
Introduction of ivermectin in Nigeria and early
involvement of NGOs
In 1989, when Merck’s donation of MectizanWfor the treat-
ment of human onchocerciasis was announced, the Inter-
national Eye Foundation (IEF) and Africare managed to get
a two year grant from the Public Welfare Foundation to
support the Ministry of Health in distribution of the drug
ivermectin in Kwara State (now part of Kogi State). Iver-
mectin distribution in Kaduna State was also initiated in
1989 with support from Sightsavers.
Mobile treatment: challenges
The system of distribution by mobile teams of health
workers faced many challenges including coverage, both
therapeutic and geographic. The substantial cost of imple-
mentation to the NGDOs and health system, the reluc-
tance to take the drug by the people in some affected
communities, and the reluctance of health workers to
work in areas where ivermectin was needed, were major
obstacles to be confronted. Treatment coverage was low
because the working hours of health personnel coincided
with the time people were on their farms, or had other
community activities. The health workers did not spend
enough time in the villages for communities to under-
stand the purpose of their visit, recognise the potential
benefits of ivermectin and the need for long-term use of
the drug. ‘I recall a visit to a village in Kaduna State
where the village was totally empty due to a funeral’
(former National Eye Centre Director). ‘Many communi-
ties associated the treatment with birth control’ (Carter
Center Country Director).
For their part, as elsewhere, policy makers were appre-
hensive of possible adverse effects of ivermectin and its
safety in large scale community use. The correct applica-
tion of the exclusion criteria was of major concern,
especially as experience during the community trials
revealed that individuals concealed pregnancies and ill-
nesses in order to benefit from deworming effects of the
drug.
In parallel with Sightsavers’ work in Mali, the IEF/
Africare supported projects in Kwara State were also
piloting a community-based approach. As the former
Africare Country Director explained, in an interview
in 2011, ‘There were a lot of restrictions on the ad-
ministration of ivermectin, but no clear guidelines so
we felt we had to violate the rules in order to getstarted’. In 1991, after the presentation of Africare
and Sightsavers on the feasibility of community-based
treatment with ivermectin (CBTI) at the WHO in
Geneva and to NOCP Nigeria, the decision was
reached to move towards the CBTI strategy.
Early in 1993, the NOCP Zone C Coordinator for on-
chocerciasis accepted an invitation by Sightsavers to visit
the pilot CBTI programme in Mali. In the report he sub-
mitted on his return he stated that ‘Above all, the com-
munity based distribution which entails maximum
participation by the communities themselves appears to
hold promise for the success and sustainability of the
Mectizan distribution programme’. This strategy, which
was found to be less expensive, ensured that, once
trained, community members, as opposed to health
workers, provided the treatments themselves. The
mobile treatment was progressively replaced by the
community-based treatment strategy.
By 1996 CBTI expanded to all endemic States,
supported by a number of international NGDOs and a
local NGDO, MITOSATH. It was agreed to assign a
single NGDO per State. All endemic States with the
exception of Akwa Ibom were therefore provided with
NGDO or UNICEF support, and an NGDO Coalition
was formed the same year to work with the NOCP.
UNICEF was also instrumental in helping with the
logistics of ivermectin supply and, together with the
NGDOs, helped build accountability into the program.
Although there were little in the way of side effects, there
were limitations of the CBTI strategy, as noted by the
Carter Center Country Director, ‘Community-based
distributors were appointed by the community leaders not
selected by community members. The CBDs were over
worked because it was only one CBD per community. CBDs’
accessibility and acceptability due to political/clannish
differences were major challenges’.The development of Community-Directed Treatment with
Ivermectin (CDTI) in Nigeria
With the creation of APOC, the CBTI approach was
found not to be the best solution to building sustainable
distribution of ivermectin. The communities needed to
take ownership of the programme, as ivermectin
distribution might well be required for at least 20 years
if transmission of infection was to be interrupted. ‘While
CBTI implied that the treatment programme is placed
within the community, the health workers, health systems
and NGDOs still played a major role.’(UNICEF
Onchocerciasis Coordinator). ‘CDTI on the other hand
meant that the communities took ownership of the
programme and decided on how to run it after training
by the health workers and NGO partners ’ (former
National Eye Centre Director).
Meredith et al. Health Research Policy and Systems 2012, 10:16 Page 9 of 16
http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/10/1/16In 1997, the NOCP in partnership with the NGDO
Coalition adopted the CDTI strategy with support from
APOC. The CDTI strategy transferred most of the
responsibility for onchocerciasis control to the affected
communities and this strategy revolutionized the
programme in Nigeria. It led to a massive increase in
the number of health staff and community personnel
trained and treatments dramatically increased from
about 6 million in 1996 to 27.4 million by 2010. By
2008, about 98% of target communities were being
covered and a minimum of 75% therapeutic coverage
had been sustained for over 5 years. Over 30,000
communities, many of them in remote areas, have been
reached.
In the expansion of the CDTI strategy to all endemic
areas, the UNICEF Coordinator noted ‘From headquar-
ter to States, the NGOs built the capacity of both the
health workers and the communities to deliver ivermec-
tin; developed the guidelines and made it available
across the country’. At the same time, he recognized the
facilitating roles of APOC and the Nigerian govern-
ment. The secretariat of APOC in Ouagadougou led
the process of launching approved CDTI projects in Ni-
geria and other countries in the programme, but the
catalytic role of the NGDOs was important: ‘The NGOs
were a catalyst that propelled the implementation of
CDTI in the country’ (former CBM Country Director ).
By 1998, ivermectin treatment in parts of south-east
and south-west Nigeria was reported to have led to a re-
duction in some of the clinical symptoms of onchocer-
ciasis [34]. Recent epidemiological surveys supported by
APOC have shown that onchocerciasis transmission may
have been interrupted in Zamfara, Kaduna, Ebonyi,
Enugu, parts of Cross Rivers and Taraba States following
12 to 16 years of Ivermectin treatment[16].
The partnership between the Ministry of Health and
NGDO Coalition in Nigeria has brought about
completion of mapping of onchocerciasis, increased
and sustained treatment coverage, initiation and ex-
pansion of other community-based interventions, as
well as the provision of a huge personnel resource
base, particularly at the community level, contributing
to strengthening health systems. It also facilitated the
submission of proposals to and access of funds from
APOC and assisted with the reporting on those funds.
Development and scale-up of other interventions in
Nigeria using CDTI as a vehicle
Having made significant progress in the delivery of iver-
mectin using the CDTI approach, the NGDOs began in-
cluding other health interventions which communities
needed. One example is the distribution of albendazole for
the elimination of lymphatic filariasis (LF) and praziquantel
for the control of schistosomiasis in Plateau and NasarawaStates by The Carter Center, beginning in 1999. Between
2001 and 2009, Sightsavers, HKI, and CBM began to in-
clude in the existing onchocerciasis treatment programmes
Vitamin A supplementation, primary eye care, rehabilita-
tion of the blind and distribution of insecticide-treated nets
for malaria control. The supporting NGDOs took the lead
in ensuring appropriate training of health staff, as well as
the availability of health education materials and drugs or
equipment. In some cases, communities themselves started
asking their CDDs experienced in onchocerciasis control
to be become distributors of additional interventions.
Challenges in co-implementation and integration were
encountered - ‘With LF integration to onchocerciasis con-
trol there was no reaction but when we began to integrate
other programmes such as trachoma and malaria we
started to experience some resistance to integration for
fear of the unknown, resistance to change, scepticism and
the issue of territorial turfs’.(Carter Center Country Dir-
ector). However once resistance was overcome, the ben-
efits of joint training, implementation and monitoring
were appreciated, as was the cost benefit.
This partnership, founded on the onchocerciasis
programme, paved the way for the emergence of a co-
ordinating mechanism for Neglected Tropical Diseases
(NTDs) at the Federal level, and has contributed to the
development of an NTD plan of action for the country.
As the UNICEF Coordinator observed there is still more
potential ‘CDTI should be linked to programmes sup-
ported by NGDOs that can benefit hugely from the CDD
network, for instance, the Maternal & Newborn week. If
the CDTI concept could be brought into the Maternal
and Newborn week programmes- that would be novel
and successful’.
Case study 3 : Cameroon
Introduction
Before control activities, onchocerciasis was endemic
in much of the country, and indeed some of the
seminal work on the existence of different strains of
Onchocerca volvulus, savanna and forest onchocerciasis,
and O.volvulus-Simulium complexes was carried out in
Cameroon[38] [39]. Severe ocular lesions and blindness
occurred in the Touboro region (Sudan savanna regions) of
north eastern Cameroon with up to 90% prevalence [40],
whilst 95% prevalence and high microfilarial loads, but lim-
ited ocular involvement, were reported from forest areas of
Cameroon (Central, South and Southwest provinces).
In the 1980s and 90s, the Edea region, Vina valley in the
north and the Sanaga valley in South province were areas
of intense research programmes on the epidemiology,
transmissions and mass treatment with ivermectin
(carried out by Tubingen University and ORSTOM/ IRDa
in collaboration with the University of Yaoundé). These
programmes involved routine skin snipping and blood
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community acceptance of mass treatment.
Cameroon, along with Nigeria, was one of the first
countries to complete the rapid epidemiological mapping
of onchocerciasis (REMO)[41,42] which delineated the
main foci and determined the at risk population to be 3.5
million - 50% of the total rural Cameroonian population
[42]. The REMO and REA (rapid epidemiological
assessment) were critical for the success of the APOC
programme and the National Onchocerciasis Coordinator
at the Ministry of Public Health ( MoPH) in Cameroon
played an important role in the development and imple-
mentation of the REMO.Early NGDO involvement and introduction of ivermectin
In 1991 the River Blindness Foundation (RBF) was fund-
ing the International Eye Foundation (IEF), and later
Helen Keller International (HKI), who were carrying out
pilot treatment programmes in Southern Cameroon and
the Sanaga river basin. In 1992 RBF started its own treat-
ment programme in Garoua (northern Cameroon). CBM
supported hospital based programmes at Acha Tugi,
Ngaoundéré and Enongal. At the same time, research pro-
grammes using Mectizan were supported by TDR and
GTZ (German aid) in the Vina valley and Edea regions.
The early ivermectin distribution strategy was a mobile
team/outreach approach, similar to that used for other
interventions e.g immunization. The NGDOs trained
nurses from the health centres who would go to the vil-
lages to distribute the ivermectin, having sent information
beforehand to announce their arrival. However coverage
and compliance were a problem and it was seen early on
that the timing of drug distribution was not right and the
community needed to be involved in the discussions and
decisions regarding this. The then RBF Country Director
said “In some communities the turnout was very poor so we
went back and asked why?” This was echoed by the former
HKI Onchocerciasis Director “The communities explained
that it was the harvest/rains/not a convenient time so then
HKI consulted with the community on timing of
distribution.”
After informal discussion of these issues, the NGDOs
involved increasingly moved to a community-based ap-
proach to distribution in line with practice in other en-
demic countries. In 1994, the NGDO coalition was
formally established with IEF, HKI, RBF, and the Lions
Clubs (Sightsavers joined in 1995).Challenges
The ivermectin distribution programmes in Cameroon
faced several difficult challenges, as there were two
issues that set Cameroon apart from many of the other
APOC countries.1. Cameroon had adopted the Bamako initiative, and
onchocerciasis control efforts had to be integrated into
the local primary health care system (PHC) which
included a cost recovery component.
2. Safety - the problems associated with ivermectin
treatment of people co-infected with Loa loa and O.vol-
vulus (See Co-infection with Loa Loa).
In terms of the first challenge, MoPH insisted on using
the cost recovery mechanism which caused tension with
the NGDO Coalition. The Ministry was also concerned
about the handling of the drugs by village health workers
with only basic training, let alone by untrained commu-
nity members. In addition, nurses at the health centres
who benefited from the cost-recovery system were reluc-
tant to relinquish their role. On the part of the commu-
nities there was also reluctance: ‘You had to convince the
men that it was worth giving up the equivalent of one
beer to treat his family’ (former HKI Country Director).
‘The fact that people had to pay for a drug that would
prevent them from going blind or getting skin disease was
a real problem when they did not feel sick’ (Former RBF
Director).
Sightsavers’ country representative reported in 1996
that ‘The Ministry is still clearly concerned about sus-
tainability and proper integration with the PHC
programme – but the door was described as no longer
closed to a CBD approach – it couldn’t be described as
wide open either’.
‘ The project in Cameroon will certainly be a challen-
ging one . . .. The challenge for Sightsavers is to establish
an effective distribution system in the project area so that
the Ministry can be convinced of the merits of a
community-based distribution system’ (Sightsavers’
Regional Director and River Blindness Programme
Coordinator).
Transition to CDTI
By 1996 the MoPH had accepted the principle of involving
the community in the management of the programme but
on condition that community members did not handle
the drugs. This was, in part, due to a previous bad experi-
ence where some community health volunteers, who had
been trained in basic PHC activities, went beyond their
mandate, setting themselves up as “little doctors”. This
programme was scrapped - just before the CBTI strategy
was introduced.
Cameroon launched its first APOC projects in 1998/9,
however the combination of cost recovery, the use of the
limited number of health staff available to undertake dis-
tribution, and reported side effects resulted in Cameroon
reporting the lowest (therapeutic and geographic) cover-
age. It was eventually acknowledged by the Ministry that
cost recovery was a significant barrier to uptake of the
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made that ivermectin would be free. The NGDOs and
other APOC partners played an important role in per-
suading Cameroon to adopt the CDTI strategy and from
then on coverage improved, although the Government
decision to pay the CDDs meant that there were often
interruptions in the distribution when payment was late.
Co-infection with Loa Loa
Safety was the biggest challenge for both the NGDOs and
the MoPH in Cameroon. Shortly after the first mass treat-
ment programmes began in central and southern Camer-
oon, serious neurological adverse events were reported in
patients with very high Loa loa microfilaraemia [43] . This
had a major impact on programme implementation in
terms of timing, roll-out, supervision, training and moni-
toring. Epidemiological surveys were undertaken to deter-
mine the area co-endemic for loasis and onchocerciasis
and at-risk populations. Monitoring procedures were
established and adhered to during distribution so that
people developing serious reactions would receive prompt,
appropriate treatment [44,45]. The NGDOs worked with
the national programme to identify the health staff that
were available to supervise treatments, timetable the
process village by village, ensure that the drugs to treat
SAEs were available (often funding them), and that health
staff knew what to do, where to refer and how to report in
the event of an SAE. A rapid assessment tool (RAPLOA)
was developed by TDR for assessing prevalence of L .loa as
it was determined that the risk of severe adverse reactions
was unacceptable in onchocerciasis-endemic communities
where more than 20% of the population also has loiasis
[46]. A strong communication strategy was devised by
APOC and the MoPH. This, combined with effective case
detection and management, and enhanced treatment super-
vision in which the NGDOs played a major role, allowed
the CDTI programmes to continue, although any patients
being treated for the first time are considered to be at risk.
Despite these challenges the CDTI is now a flagship
programme for Cameroon and the Government is proud
of the CDD achievements – some of whom have been
involved in the programme for more than 15 years and
are now involved in other interventions. With APOC
and NGDO support, Cameroon has successfully inte-
grated several other activities into the CDTI, including
home malaria treatment, bed net distribution, vitamin A
and other mass chemotherapy ( Mectizan + albendazole,
mebendazole).
‘ When you put confidence in the community, they are
capable of managing the project. CDTI has served as a
channel for health interventions to improve access to services
and better health’ (former National Onchocerciasis
Coordinator).Case study 4: Uganda
Introduction
In contrast to the policy debates which took place in
Cameroon, Uganda embraced community involvement
in ivermectin distribution relatively easily.
There were, however, significant differences between
West African countries and Uganda in terms of the disease
itself – the nature of the predominant vector - and the
health service structure. In Uganda, onchocerciasis is
mainly meso-endemic and is confined to foci in the west
and northwest of the country with a small focus on the
border with Kenya around Mount Elgon. The disease is
transmitted by two vectors Simulium damnosum s.l.
(common in West Africa) and S. neavei. Described by
Fischer et al in 1993[47], the latter accounts for 70% of
transmission in Uganda. The fly has a short flight range
which makes it less able to transmit the disease to
neighbouring areas by comparison with S. damnosum with
its much longer flight range.
In the early 1990s it was estimated that over 2 million
people in 5000 communities were at risk from onchocer-
ciasis and in 1993 a national control programme was
launched. From 1997 the programme benefited from the
support of the recently established APOC. The affected
communities were actively involved in managing the
ivermectin distribution from the beginning, as the health
services were increasingly decentralised, and based at
village level on the so-called Resistance Councils,
established in the late 80s after President Museveni took
power. The Resistance Councils and their role are
described below in the section on The Pilot Programme.
Early NGDO involvement
As early as May 1988, Sir John Wilson recommended to
the Royal Commonwealth Society for the Blind (RCSB)
their intervention in onchocerciasis control in Uganda,
following a meeting with a former Minister of Health
who reported re-emergence of the disease which had
been subject to vector control in the 1940s and 50s. In
1989 an Ophthalmic Clinical Officer based in Fort
Portal, studied onchocerciasis as part of his post-course
attachment after attending a Community Eye Health
course in London. In his report of November 1989 to
the RCSB (now Sightsavers), he claimed that the disease
was ‘a widespread problem in Western Uganda’, citing
particularly Kabarole, Kasese, Bushenyi, Hoima and
Rukungiri Districts.
The following year an Advisory Committee to the
Ministry of Health on Onchocerciasis was set up. This
comprised Ministry staff as well as representatives of
NGOs, including Sightsavers, the Uganda Foundation
for the Blind and the Church of Uganda. A meeting in
February 1990 was called to discuss a proposal for a
pilot programme of distribution of ivermectin tablets in
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to support.
The pilot programme
The seriousness of the disease and the need for action in
Hoima and Masindi are highlighted in the November 1990
report of the Sightsavers River Blindness Coordinator’s
visit. He visited the two districts during the initial distribu-
tion of ivermectin, met with health staff and community
members, and noted widespread itching of the skin. Some
people were said to be thinking of abandoning the area be-
cause of the fly nuisance and the effects of the disease,
despite the fertility of the soil. There were local reports
that ‘there were many people blinded by the disease’ and, in
the area in Masindi thought to be hyper-endemic, ophthal-
mologists saw people with onchocercal eye lesions. The
mass treatment programme in Hoima and Masindi began
in earnest in 1991, with support from Sightsavers and its
partner, the Uganda Foundation for the Blind.
The report of the February 1990 meeting spoke of the
need to ‘train and use a general Medical Officer and his
local staff to do mass distribution of ivermectin and moni-
tor, treat and report side effects of the drug’. Although use
of health staff to undertake distribution was initially the
agreed policy in Uganda, the local Resistance Council was
relied on from the beginning to assist with the census to
determine who needed treatment. The Resistance Councils
quickly assumed a critical role in relation to ivermectin
distribution, as described by the Masindi DMO, in a letter
to Sightsavers on 27 February 1991. It is worth quoting at
length.
‘Uganda happens to have a Unique Community
Organisation system where the grass-root Unit is the
Resistance Council comprising a village or two
depending on the population density, For purposes of
Community based health care, we have adopted the
same grass root unit to divide the population into the
various communities. Each of these communities,
besides having a Resistance Committee of nine people
also has a Health Committee of seven people. . .
The distribution team members and the Community
leaders sit and discuss the issue. The latter are charged
with the responsibility of under-taking household
registration. . . At the time of the Ivermectin distribution,
the health team convenes at the Community selected
centre and the distribution is done household by
household as organised by the Community leaders. The
distribution team members now record the activities in a
distribution register indicating the name, sex, age and
weight of Ivermectin recipient. The dose given is recorded
and space left to record any side effects. For the
household members who are not eligible, the contra-
indication is noted and space left for subsequent action.This community based distribution method ensures
comprehensive coverage and continuity. It also serves
to involve the Communities who are now able to
supervise the members of the distribution team.
Furthermore, it paves the way for other health
intervention activities and therefore in general serves
to improve the health of the people.’
So by 1991 community based methodology was
already evolving in Uganda and its use for other health
activities was foreseen.Development of community-based methodology
Reliance on health teams to undertake the actual
distribution quickly revealed its limitations in terms of
treatment on a mass scale. Reports from 1991 speak of
stretched resources, high cost per treatment because of the
allowances paid to the personnel involved, and above all
low coverage. Sightsavers’ River Blindness Coordinator
recalls that in a re-training seminar in Hoima in January
1992, ‘It was agreed to increase supervision and to simplify
the distribution method, using the “Mali” model: village
volunteers had to be actively involved in the actual distribu-
tion of ivermectin, while the MOH personnel would function
as “field supervisors”’. The 1992 Annual Onchocerciasis
Report for Masindi and Hoima Districts described the role
of the distributor as follows:
‘On voluntary basis the distributor has the following
duties to perform:
 He/she has to teach and advise his/her people in the
village about onchocerciasis and the use of
ivermectin tablets
 He/she has to keep the tablets which are given to
him/her by the supervisor/field officer for distribution
to his/her people in the village
 He/she must register all, thus every person and
household in his/her village and keeps the records in
the register
 Distributes ivermectin tablets to all the eligible
people
 Observes and reports the complications due to
ivermectin tablets to supervisors/field officers.’
The National Onchocerciasis Coordinator recalls that
initially health workers were not happy with the changes,
and especially with communities taking responsibility for
the drugs, but that ‘it did not take long to change their
opinion and see that community members could handle
both drugs and side effects’. By 1994, with the communities
now undertaking community-based treatment, coverage
was improving.
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In July 1991 a delegation from the River Blindness Foun-
dation of the USA visited Uganda to discuss the develop-
ment of a national plan to combat onchocerciasis with
the MOH and partners. This was preceded by a visit to
Sightsavers in the UK to discuss potential collaboration.
The RBF established the Global 2000 River Blindness
Programme which supported the Ministry of Health to
establish a countrywide control programme which began
in 1996. RBF provided funds until APOC began support
in 1997. At that point The Carter Center took over RBF
activities and effectively became the lead NGDO co-
financing the control of onchocerciasis in Uganda, while
Sightsavers continued to support the original districts,
Hoima and Masindi (which later became three when
Hoima was divided in two, Hoima and Kibaale). By then
CDTI had become the methodology for ivermectin dis-
tribution accepted by all partners within APOC.
Integrating onchocerciasis programmes with other health
and development activities
In 2001 a meeting took place in Entebbe, funded by
APOC, to review the use of the community-directed
approach to initiate other health activities. Following on
from this, the governing board of APOC asked TDR to
undertake a study on CDI. The TDR research on
Community-directed interventions for major health
problems in Africa [28] included a study site in Uganda
(Arua, Sironko, Kyenjojo, Kanungu and Nebbi districts).
This multi-country study looked at the use of CDTI
methodology pioneered in the onchocerciasis programmes
to address other health interventions, namely Vitamin A
distribution, insecticide-treated bed nets and home-
management of malaria, and directly observed treatment
for TB (DOTS), managed alongside ivermectin treatment.
The conclusion of the three-year study in 2008 was that
‘where already established for onchocerciasis control, the
community-directed intervention (CDI) approach should
be used for the integrated, community-level delivery of
appropriate health interventions’.
In Hoima, Masindi and Kibaale. Sightsavers and the
district health authorities used the working relationship
built up through ivermectin distribution to address eye
disease generally. By its nature as a blinding disease, the
onchocerciasis programme identified many people with
visual problems and some who had lost their sight
altogether. In 2000 it was agreed to develop Comprehensive
Eye Services (CES) in the three districts. CES is an inter-
nationally recognised model for eye care - a continuum of
prevention of blindness (principally onchocerciasis and
trachoma control, cataract surgery and provision of
spectacles for those who need them), rehabilitation services
for people already blind, and educational support to blind
children in mainstream schools. A critical factor is thewillingness of sectors within government and supporting
NGOs to build a referral system so that, for instance, a
child with low vision is provided with the spectacles and
other devices and the support to enable him/her to
progress in school, or that an adult diagnosed blind from
onchocerciasis is referred to rehabilitation services. An
evaluation of CES in the three districts in 2004 found that
despite some shortcomings – for example, transfer of
trained personnel, over-reliance on NGO funding – a
referral system for people with eye problems was in place
and working and that relations between the government
organs and the voluntary sector were strong.
The success of the network, from community to
national level, established through the onchocerciasis
programme in the 1990s, was a factor which led to
Uganda becoming one of the first countries to develop
an integrated package for the control of Neglected
Tropical Diseases.Conclusions
In summary, these case studies illustrate how the
community-based approach was piloted by an NGDO in
Mali and was implemented on a much larger scale in Ni-
geria. Although both countries eventually embraced
CDTI, challenges of training, supervision, logistics and
accountability needed to be addressed by the NGDOs
and national programmes. In Cameroon, the NGDOs
and APOC had to convince the government to change
policy and adopt CDTI as well as facing the major
challenge of dealing with the Loa-related SAEs. In
contrast, the Ugandan health system was already open
to community involvement, quickly embraced CDTI and
has now officially adopted CDTI for other health inter-
ventions. Understanding the local health and social en-
vironment, combined with a gradual and flexible
approach which demonstrates the benefit of community
involvement are the main lessons that emerged.
The success and advantage of CDTI for onchocerciasis
control over other community models comes from its
ability to mobilise communities to take on the responsibil-
ity for an activity of a short duration (part-time over a few
weeks) once a year. The packages of drugs are not too
large and can be easily transported on the back of a bi-
cycle; calculation of dosage is easy with the height poles;
the exclusion criteria are not too difficult to determine;
and the system of recording usage can be handled by
people without high levels of literacy. CDTI is thus suit-
able for unpaid village volunteers. It does not take them
away from their other responsibilities for too long, and the
community can find ways of compensating them such as
by helping them with their farm work or building a house.
Compare that to the difficulty of transporting and deliver-
ing heavy insecticide-treated bed nets, or monitoring the
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period of months (DOTS).
In addition to their role in programme development the
NGDOs also contributed to research on height/weight data
to allow use of height for mass treatment in Nigeria and its
subsequent uptake; ensured collaboration and coordination
on treatment strategies and policies, coalition building, and
advocated and raised funds for onchocerciasis control at
national and international level. The resources which
NGDOs brought to national programmes helped with a
range of activities including briefing new health officials on
programme implementation, troubleshooting where treat-
ment was not going well and generally helping the national
staff to manage the programmes better.
Moreover, NGDOs initiated the integration of other ap-
propriate health interventions into CDTI, starting with
HKI and the inclusion of Vitamin A supplementation.
Although integration is generally lauded as a positive
development – the challenges are also recognized. At what
point does a CDD, or others in the village willing to volun-
teer their time, become overloaded to the detriment of
standards and increasing community fatigue? As the
former TDR disease Coordinator, said ‘The question is –
will the community–based approach really be sustainable
once the onchocerciasis programmes scale back or is it the
driving force?’
For Merck and the Mectizan Donation Program the ac-
tive participation of non-governmental development orga-
nizations has been particularly important to the continuing
success of the MDP. In the early years of the programme,
NGDOs working in the area of blindness prevention
throughout Africa served as a catalyst for the delivery of
ivermectin. Then NGDOs provided substantial funding
and are still prepared to raise funds to provide support to
these long-term programmes. They continue to play a crit-
ical role, particularly in countries where local health ser-
vices lack appropriate and necessary resources [9]. As a
result of 25 years of the Merck Mectizan Donation
programme, the OCP and APOC partnerships more than
800 million dose of ivermectin have been given to over 90
million people[48]. Onchocerciasis has been significantly
reduced in more than 25 countries and focal transmission
likely to be interrupted in at least 10 countries[48]. Recent
estimates in the decline of infection, severe itch, visual im-
pairment and blindness for 15 APOC countries from 1995
to 2010 show that control operations have averted more
than 63 million DALYs, at a relatively nominal cost of US$
257 million[49]. With annual doses for 10–19 years, iver-
mectin, renamed by rural communities as a “wonder drug”,
has dramatically lowered the prevalence of onchocerciasis
[16]. Recent publications on the feasibility of elimination of
onchocerciasis in Africa[18,31] with ivermectin alone,
underscored the effectiveness of the CDTI strategy and the
power of this unique partnership .As Cupp et al [48] state, ‘Ivermectin may have
changed the face of tropical medicine more than any
other drug this century’. The introduction of ivermec-
tin enabled the evolution of new, effective and
sustainable strategies of community-based health
interventions which are now being adopted for other
diseases. Indeed, the neglected tropical disease (NTD)
agenda would not have been feasible without the
CDTI framework.
The transformation of outreach treatment strategies to
community- based methodologies was a natural evolution.
However, there is general consensus from the various sta-
keholders and partners interviewed that the transition to
community-based treatment and then to CDTI would not
have happened without NGDO involvement - or if it did it
would have been very slow. NGDOs were the driving
force- their strength being in outreach and community
engagement. ‘NGDOs played a key role and will continue
to play a key role when the APOC finishes- they will still
be there’ (former APOC Director).
As stated earlier, it is widely acknowledged that the
success of control of onchocerciasis in Africa was due
to the partnership between governments of endemic
countries, the international donor community, NGDOs,
international health and development experts, research
institutions, and the effectiveness of the control
strategies. While OCP and APOC provided leadership,
the NGDOs working with the national health author-
ities played a major role in developing the community
methodology which led to achieving the treatment of
90 million people with ivermectin each year, and which
was further developed for use by other health and
development programmes.
The NGDOs have played an evolving role over the last
15 years, working increasingly closely with the WHO on
policy, political commitment and advocacy – with a
greater clarity of their role and purpose.
End note
a In 1993 the NGO coordination group for ivermectin dis-
tribution made the decision to use the term Non-
Governmental Development Organization, NGDO to
emphasize the development focus of their activities
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